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I. INTRODUCTION
On March 4, 1981, the United States Government Accounting
Office released a study' on the impact of the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act 2 (FCPA) on the American position in world trade. The
study concluded that the FCPA has made it difficult for American
companies to obtain lucrative foreign contracts.3 The Government
Accounting Office also analyzed the anti-bribery laws of other na-
tions and found that for purposes of regulating trade abroad "no
other nation has antibribery prohibitions similar to the Act."'4
This article focuses on the FCPA and its interrelation with the
anti-bribery laws of three nations: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Indo-
nesia. These nations were selected because they rely heavily on ex-
traordinary payments in awarding government contracts.5
Numerous law review articles have discussed the goals, moral-
ity, and limitations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.6 We do
* These two words are terms for bribery in the Middle East and Indonesia,
respectively.
** Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Indonesia.
1. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
IMPACT OF FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ON U.S. BUSINESS [1981 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 82,841 [hereinafter cited as GAO].
2. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78m(b)(2), 78dd-l to
78ff (Supp. 11 1978) [hereinafter cited as FCPA].
3. See GAO, supra note 1, at 84,113. This study found that 30% of the corporations
responding to the GAO survey and which engaged in foreign business reported that they
had lost business as a result of the FCPA. In addition, over 60% reported that American
companies were at a disadvantage against foreign competitors because of American anti-
bribery laws. See also TIME, March 16, 1981, at 58.
4. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: IMPACT OF FOREIGN COR-
RUPT PRACTICES ACT ON U.S. BUSINESS 45 (Comm. Print 1981) [hereinafter cited as CoMP-
TROLLER GENERAL].
5. N. JACOBY, P. NEHENKIS & K. EELLS, BRIBERY AND EXTORTION IN WORLD Busi-
NESS 4-22 (1977) [hereinafter cited as JACOBY].
6. See generally, Dundas & George, HistoricalAnalysis of the Accounting Standards of
Loy L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. JVo
not seek to duplicate their efforts. Rather, the focus of this article is
on known loopholes in the FCPA and their correlation to the laws
of these three OPEC countries.
Since most authors writing about the FCPA have discussed the
Act from a moral standpoint (in line with stated Congressional in-
tent7 ), few materials are available which take a clear-cut approach
to minimal compliance with the Act. Likewise, there are few articles
in the English language detailing the anti-bribery regulations of any
of the OPEC countries. For these reasons, our method of research
consisted of surveying prominent authorities on business practices
and regulations in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Indonesia. In the
course of this survey, the authors of this article contacted American
embassies abroad, prominent law firms in the selected countries,
Chambers of Commerce of OPEC nations, and over 100 American
(Forbes and Fortune 500 listed8) companies doing business in the
selected countries.
II. THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
The FCPA imposes three basic requirements on American cor-
porations doing business abroad: (1) Creation of certain account-
ing and reporting standards for domestic corporations; 9
(2) prohibition of certain payments by publicly held corporations;' 0
and (3) prohibition of certain payments by other non-SEC regu-
lated entities and individuals."
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 10 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 499 (1980); Sprow & Benedict,
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977: Some Practical and Suggested Procedures, I
CORP. L. REV. 357 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Sprow & Benedict]; Surrey, The Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act." Let the Punishment Fit the Crime, 20 HARV. IN'T'L L.J. 293 (1979); Note,
Accountingfor Corporate Misconduct Abroad" The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of1977, 12
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 293 (1979); Smallwood, Multinational Enterprises and Problems of Doing
Business Abroad, 4 INT'L TRADE L.J. 351 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Smallwood]; Note,
Effective Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 32 STAN. L. REV. 561 (1980);
Corruption and the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct of1977, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 158 (1979);
Note, In Search ofan International Solution to Bribery. Impact ofthe Foreign Corrupt Prac-
ticesAct of 1977 on Corporate Behavior, 12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 59 (1979).
7. HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, UNLAWFUL CORPORATE
PAYMENTS ACT OF 1977, H.R. REP. No. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in [1977] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4098; SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AF-
FAIRS, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT OF 1977, S. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-
5, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4098.
8. Both manufacturing and service businesses were sampled.
9. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (Supp. 11 1978).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-I (Supp. 11 1978).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (Supp. 11 1978).
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. Although the accounting requirements of the Act impose a
heavy financial burden on American corporations,' 2 these provi-
sions alone are not regularly enforced by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission.13 In a recent statement regarding enforcement
of the Act, former SEC Chairman Harold Williams clearly ex-
plained: "[Tihe Commission has not sought out violations of the
accounting provisions for their own sake; indeed, we have not cho-
sen to bring a single case under these provisions that did not also
involve other violations of the law."' 4 Accordingly, this article will
not address these accounting provisions.
A recent issue of the Corporation Law Review' 5 set forth the
elements of a violation of the Act:
(1) the use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of inter-
state commerce, (2) corruptly in furtherance of (3) an offer, pay-
ment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of
anything of value (4) to any foreign political party or official or
candidate thereof, or any intermediary while knowing or having
reason to know that any portion of such payment will be offered,
given or promised to such foreign person (5) for the purposes of
inducing such foreign person to do any act or make any decision
in his official capacity or use his influence with any foreign gov-
ernment to effect or influence any act or decision of such govern-
ment or instrumentality (6) in order to assist such issuer or
domestic concern in obtaining or retaining business for or with
any person.' 6
Punishment for violation of the Act can be quite severe, since
any violator (including an officer, director, or stockholder 7 ) is sub-
ject to imprisonment for up to five years and a fine of up to
$10,000.18 Corporations are also subject to fines up to $1,000,000 for
each violation of the Act.' 9
The responsibility for enforcement of the FCPA is shared by
12. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, supra note 4, at 13. Of the corporations responding to
the GAO survey, 50% believed the burden had increased their accounting and auditing costs
by 35%; 22% reported that the burden had increased their accounting and auditing costs by
more than 35%; and 28% estimated the cost burden at less than 11%.
13. 21 S.E.C. Docket 1466, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,811.
14. Id. at 1467, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 83,934.
15. Sprow & Benedict, supra note 6, at 357.
16. Id. at 358 (footnote omitted).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c)(2) (Supp. U 1978).
18. Id.
19. 15 U.S.C § 78ff(c)(1) (Supp. 11 1978).
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the SEC and the Justice Department. 20 The SEC is charged gener-
ally with enforcing the Act against publicly traded corporations.
21
The Justice Department has power to enforce the Act against any
violator22 and has sole jurisdiction to prosecute non-corporate
defendants.23
In March 1980, the United States Department of Justice pub-
licly announced implementation of its advisory "Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act Review Procedure." 24 With this announcement, the
Department of Justice agreed that it would review questionable pay-
ments proposed by American individuals and entities before the
payments were made. If the Department rendered a favorable opin-
ion of the payment, the Department would not prosecute. 25
While the SEC declined to participate in the program, the
Commission agreed not to take any action against those whose be-
havior had been approved by the Justice Department prior to May
1, 1981.26
Although very specific information must be provided to the De-
partment in the application for Departmental review,27 approval of
the application is expressly not commensurate with immunity from
prosecution.28 In effect, this asks a potential criminal defendant to
assist in the investigation. 29
20. See 466 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-3 (1978). See also 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(c)
(Supp. H 1978) (concerning the role of the Justice Department in enforcing the FCPA).
21. 466 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-3 (1978).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(c) (Supp. I 1978).
23. 466 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-3 (1978).
24. Criminal Division Review Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 28
C.F.R. § 50.18 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Criminal Division Review].
25. Id. at § 50.18(k).
26. 20 S.E.C. Docket 1259, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 26,628.
27. Pursuant to the Criminal Division Review, supra note 24, the application for De-
partmental review must be as follows:
a) In writing;
b) Must be an actual, not hypothetical, transaction;
c) Must be submitted by a party to the transaction;
d) Must be specific and contain in detail all relevant material information bear-
ing on the conduct for which review is requested and must be signed on behalf
of each requesting party by an appropriate senior officer with operational re-
sponsibility for the conduct;
e) The Criminal Division of the Justice Department must be provided with any
additional information or documents the Division requests.
28. Pursuant to section (d) of the Criminal Division Review, supra note 24, the Justice
Department may refuse to consider a review request.
29. As of January 1981, only five entities have participated. See GAO, supra note 1.
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III. LOOPHOLES IN THE ACT
With any new legislation, certain ambiguities and differing con-
structions arise after enactment. The SEC admits that the FCPA
contains such ambiguities.
30
A. Payments for Ministerial Acts
The FCPA specifically excludes from regulation payments to
foreign government officials whose acts are essentially ministerial.
3'
This exemption allows American-regulated entities to make certain
"grease" payments to facilitate duties to which the payor would or-
dinarily be entitled.32 However, payment to a person with bureau-
cratic duties to act in a discretionary capacity is illegal, even if the
action paid for requires only a minimal amount of independent de-
cision-making.
33
B. Payments to Government Officials in Private Capacity
For payments to be outlawed by the Act, they must be made
"in order to assist [the payor]. . . in obtaining or retaining business
for or with, or directing business to, any person."34 While this
presents an apparent loophole, a substantial payment to a foreign
official outside his or her official capacity is inherently suspect.
35
C Non- Corrupt Payments
An obvious enforcement problem for the SEC or Justice De-
partment is the specific intent requirement that foreign payments be
made "corruptly. '36 Although this is not a loophole per se, it defi-
nitely narrows the scope of the Act and provides a potential defense
30. 21 S.E.C. Docket 1467, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. at 83,933.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(d)(2) (Supp. 11 1978).
32. H.R. REP. No. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., supra note 7, at 8, reprinted in [1977] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4121.
33. Id
34. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a) (Supp. 11 1978).
35. Sprow & Benedict postulate that a company should not be in violation of the
FCPA for renting office space from a foreign official operating in a private capacity. How-
ever, they feel that such transactions should be avoided should the rent payments have a
"potential influence upon the decisional process of his government affecting the payor's
business." Sprow & Benedict, supra note 6, at 359.
36. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a) (Supp. 11 1978). A "corrupt act" has been defined as one
"done voluntarily and intentionally, and with the bad purpose of accomplishing either an
unlawful end or result, or a lawful end or result by some unlawful method or means."
United States v. Strand, 574 F.2d 993, 996 (9th Cir. 1978).
19811
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to the payor.3 7
D. Extorted Payments
The FCPA is silent as to the legality of payments made pursu-
ant to a demand from a foreign official. The Senate Banking, Hous-
ing and Urban Affairs Committee considered the distinction
between bribery and extortion payments at the time the Act was
drafted.38 Concluding that an American company commits an ille-
gal act of bribery only when it can "make a conscious decision
whether or not to pay. . . ," the Committee declared that "money
paid to enter a foreign market or gain a contract would be an illegal
bribe whereas money paid to prevent the loss of foreign property
would be extortion." 39 The Committee's statement leaves substan-
tial ground for speculation as to what constitutes a bribe and what
constitutes an extortion payment.40
E Acting Through Foreign Subsidiaries and Agents
The FCPA prohibits corrupt payments made by publicly traded
corporations, their officers and employees, and "other domestic con-
cerns." 41 The bill introduced in the House of Representatives origi-
nally defined "domestic concern" in section 104 as "any corporation
. . . controlled by individuals who are citizens or nationals of the
United States." 42 The final draft, however, omitted U.S.-controlled
foreign subsidiaries in the definition of "domestic concern." 43 As a
result, SEC Chairman Harold Williams voiced his opinion on when
certain foreign subsidiaries would become subject to the provisions
of the Act:
Where the issuer controls more than 50 percent of the voting se-
curities of the subsidiary, compliance is expected. So, too, would
it be expected if there is between 20 percent and 50 percent own-
37. A payor might feel ill at ease after making a million dollar payment and relying on
the defense that it was made in an "upright and pure manner."
38. S. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., supra note 7, at 10-11, reprinted in [1977]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4109.
39. Id.
40. Whether an across-the-board demand to enter a marketplace constitutes a bribe or
extortion is a question which remains unanswered. Where all new business transactions in a
country require payment to an official, the distinction between bribe and extortion
disappears.
41. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a) (Supp. 11 1978).
42. H.R. Doc. No. 3815, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(d)(1) (Supp. I 1978).
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ership, subject to some demonstration by the issuer that it does
not amount to control. If there is less than 20 percent ownership,
we [the SEC] will shoulder the burden of affirmatively demon-
strating control.44
One commentator concluded that "[i]f such an intermediary
firm were foreign, staffed by foreigners or staffed on behalf of a for-
eign subsidiary, it may well stand outside the entire scope of the Act,
especially if no nexus with American interstate commerce and
American firms can be proven.
'45
F The 'Reason to Know" Requirement
The FCPA provides penalties for questionable foreign pay-
ments only when the parent corporation or one of its officers "has
reason to know" that a subsidiary or foreign agent made such a pay-
ment.46 The phrase "reason to know" is not defined in the Act.
However, ex-Secretary of the Treasury Michael Blumenthal stated
during House hearings on the FCPA that a twenty percent commis-
sion paid through or to a foreign agent would be suspect if industry
custom allowed a five percent commission. 47 As with the question
of "bribe" versus "extortion," this is another area of uncertainty in
the Act.
G. Entertainment Expenses
One type of payment clearly prohibited by the Act is the pay-
ment made for entertaining foreign officials.48 By the letter of the
Act, even minuscule entertainment expenses, gifts, or "anything of
value" given to influence the discretion of a foreign official is clearly
prohibited.49 However, these provisions of the Act should not be
enforced because the purpose of the Act 50 should not be to prohibit
behavior in foreign countries which is permitted at home.51
44. 21 S.E.C. Docket 1471, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 83,938.
45. Smalwood, supra note 6, at 355.
46. 15 U.S.C. 78dd(l) (Supp. 11 1978).
47. Hearings on HR. 3815 & 1602 Before the Subcomna on Consumer Protection and
Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 194
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
48. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77dd-I(a), 78dd-2(a) (Supp. I 1978).
49. Id
50. Hearings, supra note 47, at 51.
51. I.R.C. § 274 (1982).
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IV. ANTI-BRIBERY LAWS OF CERTAIN COUNTRIES
American companies not only have to comply with the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, but also applicable anti-bribery laws in the
countries in which they are doing business. This section will discuss
by country the laws of the selected member nations of OPEC.
A. Saudi Arabia
Baksheesh, the under-the-table payment, is an essential element
of Saudi Arabian business.52 One current news source estimates
that the price of contracts with the Saudi government is increased
from three to fifteen percent, depending upon the amount of bak-
sheesh paid in the course of the transaction.
53
In contradiction to the reported payments system, Saudi Arabia
has the most comprehensive collection of anti-bribery statutes of the
selected OPEC countries. Under Saudi Arabia's Royal Decree
Number 15, 54 acceptance by any public servant of any monetary
contribution given to expedite sales constitutes a crime punishable
by one to five years in prison and a fine of from 5,000 Saudi Riyals
(SR) to 100,000 SR.55 This law applies whether the Saudi govern-
ment official acts or abstains from doing any act in exchange for
such an illegal payment. 56 The same public servant is liable for
soliciting such a payment whether or not the payment is ever
made.
57
Any person making an offer of payment which is accepted is
known as a "corruptor" and is exposed to the same penalties as-
sessed against the Saudi official.
58
Any person offering a bribe which is not accepted is subject to
incarceration from six to thirty months or a fine ranging from 2,500
SR to 50,000 SR.59 Unlike the FCPA, Saudi law6° clearly describes
52. JACOBY, supra note 5, at 7.
53. "To do business in Saudi Arabia it is essential to be connected, via an agent or
middleman, to a member of the royal family which controls not just the government, but
business as well." TIME, March 16, 1981, at 59. In 1980 alone, one government minister
collected $500 million in "commission fees" alone. Id.
54. Royal Decree Number 15, 7.3.1382H (1962) (Saudi Arabia).
55. Id at art. I.
56. Id at art. II.
57. Id at art. III.
58. Id at art. VI.
59. Id at art. VII. Once payment is accepted, there is no distinction between bribery
payments and payments made upon demand.
60. Id at art. IX.
[Vol. 4
American Business Guide
those persons considered public servants subject to the anti-bribery
legislation: (1) Any permanent or temporary employee of any de-
partment of the government; (2) any arbitrator or expert nominated
by the government or any official governmental committee; (3) any
doctor or nurse responsible for issuance of public health certificates;
and (4) any employee of any Saudi company working in the public
services.
Saudi Arabia also has a comprehensive code system requiring
foreign companies to utilize Saudi agents in the course of their busi-
ness transactions.
In 1962, the Saudi Government also enacted Royal Decree M/
11,61 which provides that all goods sold in Saudi Arabia are to be
sold by a Saudi citizen or a Saudi agent registered with the Ministry
of Trade and Industry.
62
In 1975, the government expanded the 1962 Act by prohibiting
payment of a commission to any intermediary in an arms sale to the
Saudi Government. 63 Such prohibitions can be avoided through
complicated partnership arrangements. 64 It should be noted that
Article 10 of the 1978 Decree 65 states that "[t]he object of any
agency (including partnerships) may not be the exploitation of influ-
ence or mediation."
66
Violation of the agency requirements is punishable by prohibi-
tion of the corporation's future activities in Saudi Arabia, and, as to
the Saudi agent, the withdrawal of his or her registration and the
prohibition of his or her acting as an agent in Saudi Arabia.67
The Saudi government is currently reviewing its agency and
anti-bribery provisions in their entirety, which will likely lead to fu-
ture modifications of the 1978 Decree.
68
61. Royal Decree M/11 (1962), as amended by Royal Decree M/8 (1973) (Saudi
Arabia).
62. For a comprehensive discussion of these agency requirements, see MIDDLE EAST
EXECUTIVE REPORTS, Oct. 1979, at 3 and Dec. 1980, at 7; N.A. SCHILLING, DOING BUSINESS
IN SAUDI ARABIA AND THE ARAB GULF STATES 56-57 (1979).
63. Counsel of Ministers Decision Number 1275 (1975) (Saudi Arabia).
64. MIDDLE EAST EXECUTIVE REPORTS, supra note 62.
65. Royal Decree M/2 (1978) (Saudi Arabia).
66. Id
67. MIDDLE EAST EXECUTIVE REPORTS, supra note 62.
68. Id
19811
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B. Qatar
In 1971, the Qatari Criminal Code69 was amended to include
certain anti-bribery provisions. Under the section prohibiting brib-
ery of government officials, any public employee who requests or
accepts money for performing or abstaining from performing an act
within the scope of his or her duties may be imprisoned for a period
not to exceed seven years.70 Furthermore, should any Qatari em-
ployee accept money after promising to undertake such an act, he or
she is liable for such penalty whether or not he or she performs the
act.7
1
Included in the Qatari definition of bribery is "any special ben-
efit received by a public official from the sale of any property at a
price above its value or from purchase at a price below its value in
any related contract between the person giving and the person ac-
cepting the bribe."'72
Any person offering a public employee a bribe which is ac-
cepted is subject to the same seven-year period of imprisonment.
73
Any person who unsuccessfully attempts to give a bribe to a public
official may be punished by a fine not exceeding 1,000 Qatari Ri-
yals.74 Any person acting as an intermediary between a person of-
fering a bribe and a person accepting a bribe may notify the public
authorities of Qatar and be exempt from punishment. 75
In 1964, the Qatari Government adopted an agency law76 pro-
viding that no foreign entity may carry on commercial activity
within Qatar except through a registered Qatari agent or as a minor-
ity participant in a Qatari entity. Companies importing products to
Qatar for their own use 77 are exempt from this agency requirement.
In 1970, Qatar passed a law78 requiring that all foreign firms
under contract with the Qatari Government for performance of
services within Qatar appoint a Qatari agent. There are no legal
ceilings on commissions paid under government contracts. 79
69. Qatari Criminal Code Law Number 14 (1971).
70. Id at art. 109.
71. Id
72. Id
73. Id at art. 110.
74. Id at art. 111.
75. Id at art. 110.
76. Qatari Commercial Agencies Law Number 12 (1964).
77. Id Presumably these are oil companies importing drilling equipment.
78. Qatari Commercial Agencies Law Number 18 (1970).
79. MIDDLE EAST EXECUTIVE REPORTS, Dec. 1980, supra note 62, at 7.
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Qatar, a small peninsula bordering Saudi Arabia, shares many
of the customs and traditions of that country. Therefore, enforce-
ment of these all-encompassing commercial codes is reported to be
equally questionable. 80
G. Indonesia
Indonesia has a long-standing reputation for tacit approval of
bribery in its commercial system.81 Notwithstanding this reputa-
tion, Indonesia has an equally long-standing and severe anti-bribery
law.
Since 1915, Indonesia's Penal Code has contained provisions
regulating receipt of incentive payments by Indonesian civil ser-
vants.82 Pursuant to this Code, any civil servant having reason to
know that he or she has received a private payment for any act in
the course and scope of his or her employment was subject to im-
prisonment not to exceed three years and six months or a fine not to
exceed 300 Rupiah.83 The punishment was increased to five years if
the civil servant accepted such a payment with full knowledge of its
intended purposes.84
In 1971, Indonesian law was amended to provide punishment
for persons attempting to bribe government officials.8 5 Under the
new law, any person giving a present to a government official in
exchange for a discretionary act or promise by the official is subject
to twenty years imprisonment and a fine of up to 10,000,000
Rupiah.8 6 This 1971 Amendment imposed the same penalty against
any government official who failed to report receipt of any of the
aforementioned payments detailed in the 1915 Penal Code.8 7
Any officer of the court, including attorneys, prosecutors, or
judges, who accepts a bribe to influence a decision in a legal case is
80. A former oil minister of Qatar accepted a 1.5 million dollar bribe for oil explora-
tion rights which were not renewed by a subsequent Qatari minister. TIME, March 16, 1981,
at 59.
81. In Indonesia, "corruption is so family oriented that in the early 1970's, President
Suharto's wife, Tien, was known as 'Mrs. Tien Percent.'" Id at 67. Reports also indicate
that one "drab Indonesian government employee who never made more than $9000 per year
in salary in his life [left] relatives fighting over his estate . . . of nearly $35 million." Id
82. Indonesian Penal Code arts. 418-20 (1915).
83. Id at art. 418.
84. Id at art. 419.
85. Law Number 3, 1 (1971).
86. Id at I(d).
87. Id at l(e).
1981]
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subject to imprisonment of up to nine years.88 Should such an of-
ficer of the court accept a bribe in a criminal case, such person is
subject to imprisonment of up to twelve years.
89
The Indonesian Penal Code further contains a catchall phrase
outlining "dishonest competition" as follows:
He who, in order to establish, maintain or expand his or an-
other's business, commits a fraudulent act to deceive the public
or a definite person shall, if as a consequence thereof disadvan-
tages arise for his or the other's competitors, being guilty of dis-
honest competition, be punished with imprisonment of the
highest one year and four months or with a fine of at the highest
13,500 Rupiah.90
V. CONCLUSION
After examination of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the
laws and customs of the selected OPEC nations, two questions re-
main unanswered:
1. Should the United States be the only major industrialized na-
tion to regulate morality and restrict business practices
abroad?
2. Should a country where bribery is a fact of life require the
use of such payments in business dealings conducted in the
United States?
James M. Phillipi
Charles K Houser
88. Indonesian Penal Code art. 420(1) (1915).
89. Id at art. 410(2).
90. Id at art. 382.
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